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Introduction
On October 1, 2011, eight countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Korea and the United States—gathered together in a ceremony in Japan to sign the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA).1 Aiming to set a new and higher benchmark for international intellectual
property enforcement, this highly controversial plurilateral agreement was the result of three years and
eleven rounds of formal negotiations among developed and like-minded countries. This agreement was
finally adopted on April 15, 2011. As of this writing, it is still awaiting ratification and has not yet entered
into force.2
Commentators have widely criticised the ACTA negotiation process for its lack of transparency and
accountability. By ushering in a new “country club” approach to setting international intellectual property
norms, the negotiations have also raised important international concerns. This approach is likely to have
serious ramifications for both the structural integrity and continued vitality of the existing international
intellectual property regime.
As China and India noted at the June 2010 meeting of the WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, ACTA has raised a wide variety of systemic problems within the international
trading system.3 The agreement’s heightened enforcement standards will upset the delicate balance struck
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). It will
also increase the incoherence and unpredictability of the international regulatory framework.4
Similarly, Francis Gurry, the director general of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
expressed his concern that, in negotiating ACTA, countries have “tak[en] matters into their own hands to
seek solutions outside of the multilateral system to the detriment of inclusiveness of the present system”.5

*
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 11th Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul University College of Law and the
6th European Consortium for Political Research General Conference at the University of Iceland. The author would like to thank Sebastian Haunss
and Jeanette Hofmann for their kind invitations and Richard Gruner, Sebastian Haunss, Jeanette Hofmann, Patricia Judd, Ingrid Schneider, Mary Wong
and the participants of these events for their valuable comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Linzey Bachmeier, Erica Liabo and Lindsey
Purdy for excellent research and editorial assistance.
1
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties”, October
1, 2011, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag [Accessed
November 17, 2011].
2
Pursuant to art.40.1, ACTA will “enter into force thirty days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval
as between those Signatories that have deposited their respective instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval”.
3
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting, October 4, 2010, IP/C/M/63, paras 248–273.
4
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting, 2010, paras 253–255.
5
Catherine Saez, “ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says”, Intellectual Property Watch, June 30, 2010, available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multilateral-system-wipo-head-says/ [Accessed November 17, 2011].
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Michael Geist, a law professor at the University of Ottawa, also noted that “some might wonder whether
ACTA is ultimately designed to replace WIPO as the primary source of international IP [intellectual
property] law and policy making”.6
ACTA has indeed provided an excellent case study for examining the complex politics and institutional
dynamics behind the development of the international intellectual property regime. As with the past two
volumes of this journal, Volume 3 will devote its first issue to a topic of great importance to intellectual
property scholars. Focusing on the politics of intellectual property, this special issue reminds readers that
intellectual property developments are not just about law and economics—the primary foci of the previous
two special issues. Intellectual property can also be about politics. Although scholarship on the politics
of intellectual property is only emerging in the scholarly literature, policymakers and activists have long
recognised the importance of such issues.7
As an introduction to this special issue, this article examines the country club approach the ACTA
negotiating parties embraced to establish new and higher international intellectual property enforcement
standards. It points out that the agreement is flawed not only because it is a country club agreement but
also because it is a bad country club agreement. The article then situates ACTA in the context of a recent
trend of using bilateral, plurilateral and regional trade and investment agreements to circumvent the
multilateral norm-setting process. It contends that this disturbing trend could upset the political dynamics
in the current international intellectual property regime. The article concludes with a discussion of the
multiple layers of complex politics behind the ACTA negotiations: international, domestic and global. It
focuses on developments both within the new intellectual property enforcement club and without.

The ACTA Country Club
At the global level, the major criticisms of ACTA concern the limitation of its membership to developed
and like-minded countries, the lack of representation by countries in the developing world and the
agreement’s potential negative impact on the international intellectual property regime.8 To highlight the
problematic nature of ACTA, some commentators, such as Daniel Gervais, have described the agreement
as a “country club agreement”.9
Within this country club, members set rules to govern its membership. Article 36 provides details on
the ACTA Committee, which is charged with the agreement’s administration and management and is
granted broad powers to establish ad hoc committees. Article 42 delineates the procedure for amending
the agreement. Article 43 further specifies the time the agreement will be open for signature and how
countries can accede to it after the expiration of the specified period.

6
Michael Geist, “Toward an ACTA Super-Structure: How ACTA May Replace WIPO”, March 26, 2010, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca
/content/view/4910/125/ [Accessed November 17, 2011].
7
Thus far, there are few book-length studies on the politics of intellectual property: e.g. Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS
Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Peter Drahos
with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: New Press, 2003); Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth
C. Shadlen (eds), Politics of Intellectual Property: Contestation Over the Ownership, Use, and Control of Knowledge and Information (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009); Duncan Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement (London: Routledge, 2002);
Duncan Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2011); Valbona Muzaka, The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011);
Meir Perez Pugatch, The International Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004); Michael P.
Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Susan
K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
8
Peter K. Yu, “Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA” (2011) 64 SMU L. Rev. 975.
9
e.g. Daniel Gervais, “China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” (2009) 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 549,
555; IQsensato, “The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy Implications”, In Focus, June 2, 2008, p.4; Gabriel J.
Michael, “ACTA, Fool: Explaining the Irrational Resort to a New Institution”, pp.4–7, available at http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta
-papers-for-wcl-meeting-june-16-18-2010/ [Accessed November 17, 2011].
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Although the country club approach used by the ACTA negotiating parties has garnered considerable
attention from policymakers and commentators, the use of clubs to coordinate international regulatory
standards is not unprecedented. Developing countries, for instance, have frequently used coalitions to
shape their negotiating agenda, articulate more coherent positions and establish a united negotiating front.10
By using these organisational structures, countries seek to achieve leverage that otherwise would not have
existed for each country on its own.
What is interesting and somewhat different this time, however, is the developed countries’ aggressive
use of club arrangements to enhance their already very powerful bargaining position. In political science,
a burgeoning literature has been devoted to examining the use of club standards to set international norms.
In All Politics Is Global, for example, Daniel Drezner advances a typology of regulatory coordination.11
Based on the variations between the costs of adjusting national regulatory standards confronting “great
powers”12 and those confronting the rest of the world, he identifies four different types of international
regulatory standards: (1) harmonised standards; (2) sham standards; (3) rival standards; and (4) club
standards.13 Professor Drezner’s four-field matrix is highly useful to our analysis of ACTA (see Table 1).14
Table 1: A Typology of Regulatory Coordination15
Low Adjustment Costs
(The Rest)

High Adjustment Costs
(The Rest)

Low Adjustment Costs
(Great Powers)

Harmonised Standards

Club Standards

High Adjustment Costs
(Great Powers)

Rival Standards

Sham Standards

According to Professor Drezner, harmonised standards come into existence when adjustment costs are
low for both great powers and the rest of the international community. The minimum substantive and
enforcement standards in the TRIPS Agreement provide instructive examples. Because harmonised
standards are usually the product of political compromises, they tend to be low and are therefore open to
future upward adjustment. The TRIPS enforcement provisions, for instance, have been widely criticised
by developed countries and their intellectual property industries for being primitive, constrained, inadequate,
and ineffective.16 To some extent, the ACTA negotiations represent the attempt by developed countries
to make an upward adjustment to the weak harmonised standards in the TRIPS Agreement.
In contrast to harmonised standards, sham standards are developed when adjustment costs are high for
both great powers and the rest of the world. Examples of these standards are those concerning the transfer
of technology, abuse of rights and restraints on trade. One could arguably include the standards for the
protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, which have yet to become fully developed.
As the quality of these standards improves, however, they may find their way to another category.

10
Peter K. Yu, “Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action” (2008) 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 345, 370; Peter K. Yu, “Building
Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development” in Jeremy de Beer (ed.), Implementing the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Development
Agenda (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2009).
11
Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.119–148;
Heba M. Shams, “‘Club Multilateralism’ and Global Supranationalism: The Case of FATF” in J.B. Attanasio and J.J. Norton (eds), Multilateralism v
Unilateralism: Policy Choices in a Global Society (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2004).
12
Professor Drezner defines “great powers” as those having “a combination of internal market size and reduced vulnerability to external disruptions”.
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), p.35. Only the United States and the European Union fit his criteria at the moment. Drezner, All Politics Is
Global (2008), p.36.
13
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), pp.71–85.
14
Michael, “ACTA, Fool”, available at http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta-papers-for-wcl-meeting-june-16-18-2010/ [Accessed
November 17, 2011].
15
This table draws on Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), p.72.
16
Peter K. Yu, “TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel” (2011) 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 479, 483.
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When adjustment costs are high for great powers but low for the rest of the international community,
negotiations usually result in the creation of rival standards. The textbook example of this type of standard
is the provision concerning the protection of geographical indications. While the European Union favours
greater protection in this area, the United States insists that the use of certification and collective marks
would provide adequate protection to rights holders.17 The disagreement between these two major trading
powers eventually led to a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute between the United States on the
one hand and the European Union and Australia on the other.18 Such disagreement has also led to the
inclusion in US free trade agreements (FTAs) of provisions governing the relationship between geographical
indications and trademarks.19
Finally, when adjustment costs are low for great powers but high for the rest of the world, negotiations
tend to result in the development of club standards. As Professor Drezner explains:
“[A] great power concert will generate enough market power to lock in the concert’s preferred set
of regulatory standards. The combined market size of a great power concert will induce most
recalcitrant states into shifting their standards. However, states with severe adjustment costs will still
resist, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma aspect of enforcement can tempt some governments into
noncompliance; under this constellation of interests, the enforcement of standards becomes an issue.
The crucial step for coordination to take place is a coalition of the willing among the greater powers.”20
Although developing countries and their supportive commentators have widely criticised the arbitrariness
and exclusiveness of club standards, those standards have been used in other fields of international law.
In 1989, the Group of Seven (G-7) established the Financial Action Task Force in the Paris Summit to
combat money laundering (and later terrorist financing).21 In the early 1990s, this task force was extended
to countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as to a
select group of non-OECD members, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, and to regional organisations,
such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.22
While club standards have not been widely used in the intellectual property arena, one could arguably
trace the development of the TRIPS Agreement back to a two-stage process involving these standards.
The first stage took place when the United States, the European Communities and Japan banded together
to develop “highest common denominator” standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights.23 Once these standards had been accepted, the second stage kicked in when these trading
powers sought to multilateralise the standards by extending them to other members of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and later the WTO.
While many have considered the developed countries’ use of club standards undemocratic and inequitable,
the standards’ more effective outcomes can justify such use.24 As Moisés Naím, the former editor in chief
of Foreign Policy, has noted: “[A] smart multilateral approach to illicit trade has to be selective.”25

17

Justin Hughes, “Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate about Geographical Indications” (2006) 58 Hastings L.J. 299, 305–311.
“European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs”, Report of the Panel,
March 15, 2005, WT/DS174/R; “European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs”, Report of the Panel, March 15, 2005, WT/DS290/R.
19
e.g. Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, August 5, 2004, art.15.3.7.
20
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), p.75.
21
Shams, “‘Club Multilateralism’ and Global Supranationalism” in Attanasio and Norton (eds), Multilateralism v Unilateralism (2004), p.461.
22
Shams, “‘Club Multilateralism’ and Global Supranationalism” in Attanasio and Norton (eds), Multilateralism v Unilateralism (2004), p.464.
23
Daniel J. Gervais, “The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on Economic Development” in Peter K. Yu (ed.), Intellectual
Property and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2007), Vol.4, p.43.
24
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), p.75; Yu, “Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action” (2008) 34 Am. J.L. & Med.
345, 384.
25
Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), p.255.
18
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Moreover, club standards can help to avoid gridlocked situations where developed and developing countries
fail to achieve progress in multilateral negotiations—the notorious stalemate over the revision of the Paris
Convention being a good example.26 As Professor Drezner observes:
“Club IGOs, such as the … G-7 … or the OECD, use membership criteria to exclude states with
different preference orderings and bestow benefits for in-group members as a way to ensure collective
action. Compared to universal IGOs, clubs have reduced legitimacy because of their limited
membership, though this can be partially compensated through other sources of legitimacy such as
a reputation for effectiveness. Clubs also have the advantage of a membership with a more homogenous
set of preferences. The smaller number of actors also increases a club’s ability to coordinate and
enforce policy.”27
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the geopolitical reality behind traditional international intellectual
property negotiations. Regardless of what forum is ultimately used, countries—especially the weaker
ones—rarely participate equally in the development of multilateral standards, due in part to their lack of
resources, capacity and bargaining power. Even during the TRIPS negotiations, the discussions were
dominated by developed countries and a small group of hardliner developing countries, such as Argentina,
Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia.28 Participation by smaller
developing countries remained rather limited.
Thus, when examining ACTA, we need to compare its standards with those achievable under the present
conditions of international intellectual property negotiations. We should not focus on an ideal arrangement
that does not exist. Nevertheless, even if we take the present conditions into account, ACTA, as the next
section will show, is still a rather disappointing plurilateral agreement.

A bad country club agreement
In discussing club standards, commentators have widely noted the need to include in the negotiation
process those countries that have a significant impact on the issue area. Consider, for example, the standards
for international financial regulation established by the G-7 and the OECD. Because all the important
players in the field belong to either one of the two organisations, club standards were strategically chosen
to enable powerful developed countries to establish high standards without the worry of dilution by
marginalised players.
Once these standards have been established, an important goal of the G-7 and the OECD is to expand
the club to outside players. As Professor Drezner explains:
“In dealing with nonmembers, a club IGO can encourage the pooling of resources to induce outsiders
into agreeing to the core’s regulatory regime. Material inducements, such as aid or technical assistance,
can encourage peripheral states to accept the imposed standard. Small country leaders that are
sympathetic to the core position can also use pressure from an international organization to bypass
entrenched domestic interests and other institutional roadblocks. For the most recalcitrant states, a
club IGO greatly enhances the utility of multilateral coercion. Once they join, they then have an
incentive to pressure other governments into altering their regulatory standards. This dynamic produces
a cascade effect in which a club IGO expands to near-universal size.”29

26

Peter K. Yu, “A Tale of Two Development Agendas” (2009) 35 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 465, 508–511.
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), pp.67–68.
Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p.19, fn.17.
29
Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), pp.75–76.
27

28
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Over the years, new conditions have arisen, while the geopolitical make-up has changed. At times,
clubs have adjusted their membership to accommodate these changing circumstances. For example, in
the wake of the recent global economic crisis and in response to the rise of the so-called BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa), developed countries smartly redesigned their norm-setting
approach. By initiating discussions in the so-called G-20, which include emerging countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, the G-7
countries successfully expanded the “club” in the area of international financial regulation to cover new
players that have increasingly significant impacts on the field.30 Such an expansion is unsurprising. After
all, it is hard to imagine how the club could effectively respond to the sovereign debt crisis without the
cooperation of powerful emerging economies.
To some extent, the transformation of the GATT to the WTO reveals a similar need to adapt to changing
circumstances. In the beginning, the GATT, like the G-7,
“was perceived of as a ‘rich nations’ club,’ focusing on the needs of the developed nations, though
some of the more prominent developing nations such as Brazil and India played a role.”31
Most other developing countries received merely special and differential treatment. Today, however, the
WTO includes 153 members, including three different groups of countries: developed, developing and
least developed. Although the TRIPS Agreement includes transitional periods for both developing and
least developed countries, the latter two groups of countries still take on key obligations on the protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, similar to those assumed by developed countries.
If one is willing to go back even further in time, one will notice a similar dilemma confronting members
of the Berne Union, the well-known international copyright club. Following the decolonisation movement
after the Second World War and the arrival of a large number of newly emerging countries in the 1960s,
developed countries in the Union had to decide whether they wanted to maintain their high Euro-centric
copyright standards or offer significant concessions to entice developing countries to join the Union.32 In
the end, the Berne Union members drafted the Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing Countries,
which was eventually adopted as an optional appendix to the Paris Act of the Berne Convention.33
Notwithstanding the insights and lessons provided by these helpful precedents, ACTA fails to follow
the formula for success for developing club standards. While the agreement was ambitiously designed to
include high standards, similar to those international financial regulatory standards established by the G-7
or the OECD, the agreement does not include all the important players in the field of intellectual property
enforcement. Notably excluded from the ACTA negotiations were Brazil, China and Russia, key players
whose cooperation is badly needed to reduce cross-border piracy and counterfeiting.
Even worse, unlike the other club standards discussed in this article, ACTA has a very limited ability
to induce other countries to join the club after it has been formed. In all fairness, the agreement was
originally conceived as one involving two consecutive stages. As stated in an early discussion paper:

30
Professor Drezner questions whether the G-20 is actually a club in light of the fact that it “meets only once a year, and has no secretariat or working
groups”. Drezner, All Politics Is Global (2008), p.146. Whether the G-20 is a club, however, is not important for our purposes. The most important
insight is that the G-7 has been expanded in response to changing circumstances.
31
John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling and Richard H. Steinberg, The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics
of the GATT and the WTO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.153.
32
Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2nd edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), p.885.
33
Yu, “A Tale of Two Development Agendas” (2009) 35 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 465, 471–484.
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“In the initial phase, it is important to join a number of interested trading partners in setting out the
parameters for an enforcement system that will function effectively in today’s environment. As a
second phase, other countries will have the option to join the agreement as part of an emerging
consensus in favor of a strong IPR enforcement standard.”34
Nevertheless, it remains unclear which countries this second phase will target. A leaked US government
cable, for example, has revealed that Japan and the United States initially disagreed over whether “Italy
and Canada … should be approached in the second group”.35 The US position that these countries should
be included eventually prevailed.
In contrast to Canada and Italy, major developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India, were
excluded from the very beginning of the negotiations, even though Japan emphasised early on that “the
intent of the agreement is to address the IPR [intellectual property right] problems of third-nations such
as China, Russia and Brazil, not to negotiate the different interests of like-minded countries”.36 From the
standpoint of intellectual property protection, there is no doubt that these emerging countries are important
to the successful operation of the international enforcement regime.
Consider China for example. The country’s piracy and counterfeiting problems have provided a major
impetus for the development of new international intellectual property enforcement norms. China was
also involved in a recent WTO dispute with the United States over the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.37 Given the negotiating parties’ conscious and determined choice to exclude
China from the negotiations, it is unclear how they can now entice China to join this new exclusive club.
It is worth comparing ACTA with the WTO, an international trade club China joined a decade ago. In
the 1990s and early 2000s, China was very eager to join this club and accede to the TRIPS Agreement
even though it had to revamp a large array of laws and regulations and agree to high WTO-plus standards.38
As Samuel Kim observed at that time, China was willing “to gain WTO entry at almost any price”.39 The
country’s approach was understandable. To many Chinese, the WTO membership helped secure China’s
rightful place in the international community. Even if the economic costs were high, the symbolic value
of the WTO accession and an improved standing in the international community would more than
compensate for the short-term costs.
ACTA, however, is not the WTO. It does not give China a rightful place in the international community.
Nor does the club membership seem to have any bearing on China’s dignitary interests. While it could be
unattractive for China to be branded as a pirating nation, ACTA is not limited to countries that have always
respected intellectual property rights. The chequered pasts of Japan and the United States, the two major
proponents of this agreement, speak for themselves. More importantly, at the time of the negotiations,
Canada, South Korea and a few EU member states were on the United States Trade Representative’s
Special 301 Watch List.40 Even under the standards set unilaterally by the United States, the ACTA country
club is a den filled with known pirates.
Even worse, the illegitimate nature of ACTA heavily undercuts the argument’s moral basis. To begin
with, the negotiating parties’ insistence on completing the agreement through a shady backdoor deal has
greatly undermined the legitimacy of the adopted standards. As Kimberlee Weatherall reminds us:
34
“Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement”, p.1, available at http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/ACTA
-discussion-paper-1.pdf [Accessed November 17, 2011].
35
Michael Geist, “Japan Wanted Canada Out of Initial ACTA Group”, February 25, 2011, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view
/5656/125/ [Accessed November 17, 2011].
36
Geist, “Japan Wanted Canada Out of Initial ACTA Group”, February 25, 2011, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5656/125/
[Accessed November 17, 2011].
37
“China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights”, Report of the Panel, January 26, 2009, WT/DS362/R.
38
Peter K. Yu, “The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World” (2011) 13 Or. Rev. Int’l L. (forthcoming).
39
Samuel S. Kim, “China in World Politics” in Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot (eds), Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of
Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 2004), p.49.
40
Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)”, August 4, 2008, p.3, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_15084.pdf [Accessed November 17, 2011].
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“The secrecy [in the ACTA negotiations] is … operating, once again, to bring intellectual property
law into disrepute. To the extent that at some later point governments and IP owners will ask people
to accept the outcomes as ‘fair’ and ones that should be adopted, it will be more difficult to convince
them when the agreement has the appearance of a secret deal done with minimal public input.”41

Indeed, the adopted standards tell us more about like-mindedness than moral wrongs. At the international
level, there remains no philosophical or normative consensus on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights.42
Like China, Brazil and India have shown no urgent desire to join ACTA. Nor have they found the club
membership advantageous. As Anand Sharma, the Indian commerce and industry minister, emphatically
declared: “If [the TRIPS Agreement] has to be revisited in any stage in future, it will be only in multilateral
forum—the WTO, it cannot be done outside”.43 Likewise, Brazilian officials refused to “recognize the
legitimacy of the treaty”.44
The reactions of Brazil, China and India are indeed no surprise. In today’s age, these increasingly
powerful developing countries are unlikely to buy into a system they did not help to shape. With their
now considerable increase in economic power and geopolitical leverage, those days where a system could
be created in developed countries and then shoved down their throats are long gone. If “enhanced
international cooperation and more effective international enforcement” are some of ACTA’s key goals,
as stated in the preamble, it is simply ill-advised to ignore these crucial partners in the negotiations. It is
also short-sighted to consider countries unclubable by virtue of their lack of like-mindedness.
Compared with Brazil, China and India, small middle-income or low-income countries do not have the
same bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States or the European Union. Nevertheless, it is still unclear
how effective ACTA actually will be in inducing these countries to adopt higher intellectual property
enforcement standards. After all, those countries that are overly eager to obtain trade benefits from the
United States or the European Union are likely to agree to ACTA-like standards in non-multilateral
agreements regardless of whether ACTA is adopted. By contrast, those countries that remain on the fence
and that have enough power to resist pressure from the United States or the European Union are unlikely
to find ACTA attractive. The reason is simple: ACTA offers neither carrots nor sticks.
The two “carrots” developed countries typically dangle in front of developing countries to entice them
to offer stronger protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights are (1) increased foreign direct
investment (FDI) and (2) accelerated transfer of technology. After more than 15 years of disillusionment
in the TRIPS Agreement, many developing countries have begun to realise that the oft-presented carrots
may be illusory.
To date, economists have widely questioned the link between intellectual property protection and FDI.45
As Keith Maskus noted, if stronger intellectual property protection always led to more FDI:
“recent FDI flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and
Eastern Europe … [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-growth, large-market developing
economies with weak IPRs”.46
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More importantly, developed countries have a longstanding history of failing to respect technology transfer
obligations in international intellectual property agreements—art.66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, for
example. Although the Doha Ministerial Decision of November 14, 2001 reaffirmed the mandatory nature
of these obligations, developed countries, thus far, have yet to take these obligations seriously. Thus,
whether in the form of FDI or technology transfer, ACTA does not offer any attractive carrot.
The “stick” developed countries typically use in response to low intellectual property standards involve
unilateral sanctions. However, in United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the WTO
dispute settlement panel made it clear that members are not allowed to use sanctions to resolve
TRIPS-related disputes until they have exhausted all the remedies permissible under WTO rules.47 Because
ACTA is designed as a TRIPS-plus agreement and covers rights falling largely within the scope of the
TRIPS Agreement,48 unilateral sanctions are unlikely to constitute a permissible stick.
To be certain, the United States could still rely on the monitoring mechanism in s.301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 to “punish” those countries that have failed to abide by ACTA standards. After all, the US Trade
Act of 2002 stipulates that the United States Trade Representative can take s.301 actions against countries
that have failed to provide “adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding
the fact that [they] may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agreement”.49
Nevertheless, without the teeth provided by unilateral sanctions, the s.301 process is at best a shaming
device.50 As annoying as this device may be to developing countries, the process’s ability to induce
developing countries to join ACTA or adopt its standards is significantly constrained.
In sum, by leaving out the key parties needed for cooperation and by providing neither carrots nor sticks
to induce non-members to subsequently join the agreement, ACTA has failed dismally even under its own
theoretical model. ACTA is flawed not only because it is a country club agreement but also because it is
a bad country club agreement. Given this weakness, and its many well-documented negative side-effects,51
one cannot help but wonder why countries negotiated this agreement in the first place.

The non-multilateral era
Although it is bad enough that ACTA fails under its own theoretical model, the use of the country club
approach to international norm-setting has raised additional concerns. For example, commentators have
expressed considerable fears that, by circumventing the multilateral process, ACTA will undermine the
stability of the international trading system. The resulting instability is particularly disturbing considering
the large amount of time, energy, resources and efforts developed countries have expended to create the
TRIPS Agreement and present international intellectual property enforcement regime. The ACTA
negotiating parties’ insensitive push for tougher enforcement standards regardless of a country’s local
conditions has also alienated many trading partners.52 Such alienation is likely to make it more difficult
for the international community to undertake future multilateral discussions.
Nevertheless, non-multilateralism has some benefits. For example, it can help achieve outcomes that
otherwise cannot be achieved under a multilateral setting.53 It can also help key parties to develop a
preliminary common position that can be easily extended to other less important parties in the future.54 In
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fact, the negotiations of many key international agreements began with mini-negotiations among a small
group of key players before the negotiations were finally extended to other members of the international
community—the TRIPS Agreement being a very good example.
Thus, the question concerning ACTA is not so much about whether the agreement is a significant
departure from the usual multilateral path, but whether the agreement’s non-multilateral approach can
eventually help consolidate the countries’ positions through the multilateral process.55 As the previous
section has shown, the answer to this question is mostly negative. By ignoring major developing countries
and key players in the intellectual property enforcement area, ACTA is unlikely to facilitate the development
of practical compromises that can be multilateralised in future negotiations.
More importantly, when ACTA is juxtaposed with the many recent bilateral, plurilateral and regional
trade and investment agreements, it makes salient a recent and highly disturbing trend of using
non-multilateral arrangements to circumvent the multilateral norm-setting process. Indeed, if ACTA
represents the future of international norm-setting, non-multilateralism will not be the passing phase many
policymakers and commentators expect—a short, inevitable transitional period before the development
of a new multilateral arrangement, such as TRIPS II. Instead, the world will likely go through a long
period of non-multilateralism, thereby generating interesting political dynamics that commentators have
not yet studied in depth.56
Such a development is consistent with the commentators’ repeat reminders that the TRIPS Agreement
should not be seen as the endpoint in the development of the international intellectual property regime.
As Susan Sell observes: “The TRIPS agreement is hardly the end of the story. In many ways, it is just the
beginning.”57 Likewise, Carolyn Deere Birkbeck writes:
“After a decade of tense North-South debates, TRIPS emerged a contested agreement. It was quickly
apparent that far from a final deal, TRIPS was rather the starting point for further negotiations…”58
In an article examining the development of bilateral trade and investment agreements established by
the United States since the turn of the millennium, Ruth Okediji traces the agreements back to those
bilateral agreements the country has signed since its founding period. As she explains:
“The so-called new bilateralism is actually more consistent with historical uses of the foreign
relations/treaty power of the United States, as well as the general framework of international law, in
its dealings with developing countries since the independence era. Consequently, it is probably the
TRIPS Agreement that is the aberration in international intellectual property law, and not the recent
spates of bilateral and regional agreements.”59
Based on Professor Okediji’s insightful observation, the TRIPS Agreement should therefore not be
considered as the endpoint of the international intellectual property regime. Nor is ACTA a drastic deviation
from the traditional path of regime development. Instead, both agreements merely represent the ups and
downs of such development.
To complicate matters further, countries have used different approaches to establish their interstate
relationships outside the multilateral process. While the United States and the European Union have
actively introduced free trade and economic partnership agreements,60 emerging countries such as China
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and India have been busy negotiating their own forms of non-multilateral agreements.61 As I have noted
elsewhere, the agreements negotiated by China have very different goals and emphases from their US and
EU counterparts. The approaches used to negotiate those agreements are also quite different.62
If these differences continue—or, worse, escalate—the international intellectual property regime will
become even more fragmented. Such fragmentation, most certainly, will result in what Jagdish Bhagwati
and other commentators have described as the “spaghetti bowl”, the “noodle bowl” or the “curry bowl”.63
Although commentators have widely studied the growing fragmentation of the international regulatory
regime, it remains unclear whether such growing complexity would benefit developed or developing
countries.
On the one hand, greater complexity will allow weaker countries to better protect their interests by
mobilising in favourable fora, developing the needed political and diplomatic groundwork and establishing
new “counter-regime norms” that help restore the balance of the international intellectual property system.64
The existence of multiple fora will also help promote “norm competition across different fora as well as
… inter-agency competition and collaboration”.65
On the other hand, a proliferation of fora will benefit more powerful countries by raising the transaction
costs for policy negotiation and co-ordination, thereby helping these countries to retain the status quo.66
The higher costs, coupled with the increased incoherence and complexities in the international intellectual
property regime, are particularly damaging to developing countries, which often lack resources, expertise,
leadership, negotiation sophistication and bargaining power.
More disturbingly, if significant differences exist between the terms found in the non-multilateral
agreements established by developed countries and those established by emerging countries, the agreements
may eventually precipitate what I have described as the “battle of the FTAs”.67 As countries continue to
dispute over what norms they should obey, the conflicting norms in non-multilateral agreements will
create complications that will eventually undermine the existing international intellectual property regime.
In fact, as Kimberlee Weatherall points out insightfully, ACTA tells us as much about the disagreement
between the negotiating parties as it does about what higher standards these countries wanted to adopt.68
Among the conflicts revealed by the ACTA negotiations are the protection of geographical indications
and the criminal enforcement of patent rights. These two disagreements have troubled the negotiations so
much that the negotiators eventually had to strike a compromise by adopting a much lighter version (the
so-called “ACTA Lite”) than what was originally advanced by the treaty’s proponents. In the wake of
such drastically reduced protection, some commentators have wondered whether the final text would be
so unattractive that some key negotiating parties would simply walk away from the treaty. To date, the
European Union and Switzerland, two of the treaty’s major proponents, have not yet signed on to the
agreement.
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Equally salient from the ACTA negotiations is the disagreement between developed countries and major
developing countries. Among the issues they continue to disagree about are access to essential medicines,
software and information technology; the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions;
enforcement in the digital environment; special and differential treatment; obligations concerning transfer
of technology, abuse of rights and restraints on trade; and the need to allow for alternative forms of
innovation and modalities for protection. If one is willing to include such new issues as global climate
change, the list can be extended even further.
Finally, the establishment of ACTA and the ongoing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement and other non-multilateral agreements have raised important questions about the future
development of South-South agreements—or what I have described earlier as IPC4D (intellectual property
coalitions for development).69 Discussions have already taken place among the fast-growing developing
countries, in the form of IBSA trilateral cooperation (including India, Brazil and South Africa) and the
BRICS summit (featuring Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).
In a recent WIPO Development Agenda meeting, some developing countries specifically demanded
the development of a project focusing on South-South collaboration.70 Although such demands were
reasonable in light of the developing countries’ common plight, the proposal met with vehement opposition
from developed countries. While the latter had a valid argument that events organised by a multilateral
organisation like WIPO should not be limited to selected members, the position they took bordered on
hypocrisy. After all, developed countries opposed the development of South-South collaboration at the
same time when they were moving full steam ahead toward the completion of ACTA, a clearly North-North
collaborative effort.
Indeed, without the complex questions raised by the mission of a multilateral organisation, one could
logically argue that, by establishing ACTA, developed countries are estopped from complaining about
similar efforts undertaken by developing countries. As Professor Gervais has recently warned us, the
change initiated by ACTA is likely to be “irreversible”.71 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether
developing countries can take full advantage of the precedent set by developed countries to establish a
better and more sustainable “club” for countries with like-minded pro-development approaches.
In sum, ACTA is problematic not only as a standalone agreement. It is also problematic because it is
emblematic of the disturbing trend by both developed and less developed countries to push for
non-multilateral arrangements that reflect their preferred norms, values and development models. If this
non-multilateral movement continues, ACTA will not be the only club deviating from the traditional
multilateral path. Other clubs will most certainly emerge from both the North and the South, further
fragmenting the existing international intellectual property regime.

Multiple layers of complex politics
Commentators have widely blamed the establishment of ACTA on the lack of progress in enforcement
discussions at both the WTO and WIPO.72 While this observation is somewhat correct, it oversimplifies
the complex politics behind the formation of the new ACTA country club. In fact, the internal club politics
are quite complex. So are the politics concerning the protesters outside the club. This section discusses
in turn three different types of politics implicated by ACTA: international, domestic and global.
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The first type of politics implicated by the agreement is obviously international. To date, the divide in
the international intellectual property debate is not as simple as one between the North and the South.
Indeed, it is increasingly common to find developed countries standing side by side with emerging or
fast-growing developing countries. An excellent illustration concerns the reluctance to publish the
negotiating text of ACTA. The first draft text was not released until after the eighth round of negotiations
in Wellington.73 Although commentators generally criticised the United States for preventing this important
text from being publicly released, one has to appreciate the greater political complexity behind the decision
not to release the negotiating draft.
As a leaked document has shown, the major holdouts before the Wellington Round were the United
States, some members of the European Union (Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Portugal), Singapore
and South Korea.74 Although the United States has been widely faulted for the non-transparent approach
used in negotiating ACTA, due in part to its geopolitical and economic strengths, this country was unlikely
to suffer the most politically if the negotiating draft were released. In fact, negotiators from Singapore
and South Korea could have been more concerned about the release than their counterparts in the United
States.75 After all, those governments were already under heavy criticism domestically for negotiating the
arguably one-sided FTAs with the United States. If the draft ACTA text were released early on, the timing
of such release could not have been worse for those governments.
To be certain, the United States was also very concerned about the release. However, its concern was
mainly due to the fear that such disclosure would result in parties walking away from the negotiation table
(in addition to further complications in the ongoing negotiations of other trade and investment agreements).76
As far as the agreement’s impact on domestic politics is concerned, however, the US negotiators are likely
to have much less to worry about than their counterparts in emerging countries.
After all, the American public is unlikely to be heavily disturbed by the treaty terms, most of which are
similar or identical to those found in existing FTAs signed by the United States. The administration’s
clear reluctance to introduce laws to implement the new agreement has also alleviated some of the reported
concerns. If such reluctance is not sufficient, it remains unclear how much attention the public has actually
paid to the ACTA negotiations. Other than internet websites, blogs and specialised newspapers, such as
Inside US Trade, the media have provided very limited coverage of the negotiations. It is also unclear
how many Americans are actually sympathetic to the positions held by developing countries and their
supporters in the developed world.
The second type of politics implicated by ACTA is domestic. As Robert Putnam has convincingly
shown, the negotiation of international treaties involves a two-level game: one domestic and one
international.77 The TRIPS Agreement provides an excellent illustration of how negotiators need to take
into consideration not only the preferences at the international level but also those at the domestic level.78
The same can be said for ACTA, where negotiators have to be sensitive to domestic demands and concerns.
As far as domestic politics are concerned, there is a tendency to simplify the overall picture within each
country. For example, developed countries are often identified with the maximalist approach that ensures
greater protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Meanwhile, less developed countries
are noted for their need for limitations, exceptions, transitional periods and special and differential treatment.
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While these caricatures are generally correct, they overlook the internal politics within each group of
countries. Even in developed countries, where intellectual property rights holders prefer strong protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, these countries continue to disagree over how high those
standards should actually be and whether those standards should vary from sector to sector. A good
example is the disagreement over appropriate patent reform in the United States between the major
companies in the software and information technology industries and those in the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries.79
Cross-sector disagreements can also be found when analysing what measures the United States would
find acceptable in ACTA. While the US movie, music and software industries have actively pushed for
the inclusion of criminal enforcement provisions in ACTA, the Intellectual Property Owners Association
insisted that those provisions should not be extended to patents.80 Such opposition continued the years-long
fight against the incorporation of criminal sanctions into the EU directive on criminal enforcement of
intellectual property rights, the so-called IPRED2.81 As Tim Frain, the director of intellectual property at
Nokia, explained to the International Herald Tribune at that time:
“[P]atent holders wanted protection but not penalties of imprisonment as they tested the boundaries
of other patents. ‘It’s never black and white,’ he said. ‘Sometimes third-party patents are so weak
that I advise managers to go ahead and innovate because, after making a risk analysis, we feel we
can safely challenge the existing patent.’
He added, ‘But with this law, even if I’m certain the existing patent is no good, the manager
involved would be criminally liable.’”82
In the end, fn.2 of ACTA struck a compromise by enabling parties to “exclude patents and protection of
undisclosed information” from the agreement’s civil enforcement provisions.
Similar cross-sector divides are present in many fast-growing developing countries, in which intellectual
property stakeholders are slowly emerging. In China and India, for example, filmmakers and computer
programmers repeatedly complain about the lack of intellectual property protection and its adverse impact
on their livelihood. To a large extent, their concerns parallel those of their counterparts in developed
countries.
In many developing countries, the interests of fast-growing stakeholders differ significantly from those
of the rest of the country. It is therefore increasingly difficult for these countries to establish cohesive
nation-based positions on intellectual property law and policy. As I have noted in the past, China may
want to have stronger protection for computer programmes, movies, semiconductors and selected areas
of biotechnology but much weaker protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilisers, seeds and
foodstuffs.83 Similar “schizophrenic” preferences can be found in other large middle-income countries,
such as Brazil and India.
Even more complicated, the positions taken by national leaders can be heavily skewed by political
payoffs—or, worse, nepotism and corruption.84 Due to a lack of coordination and other reasons, the
positions taken by policymakers in the capitals can be quite different from those residing in diplomatic
outposts.85 As I was recently reminded, even the positions held by diplomatic corps in Geneva could be
quite different from those held by their colleagues in Brussels. It is therefore no surprise that “[d]eveloping
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country diplomats working on IP issues in Geneva frequently expressed frustration with IP reforms
underway at home that sacrificed TRIPS flexibilities”.86 As we analyse the positions and interests of
developing countries, it is important we take these variations into account.
The final type of politics implicated by ACTA concerns what commentators have identified as global
politics—the type of politics that transcends the Westphalian order of nation states. While a significant
part of the critique of ACTA addresses interests of countries in the South, many of the agreement’s most
trenchant critics reside in the North. Examples of these critics are Michael Geist from Canada; the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Essential Action, Knowledge Ecology International, Public Citizen and Public
Knowledge from the United States; the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII) and La
Quadrature du Net from Europe; and global nongovernmental organisations such as Médecins Sans
Frontières and Oxfam.
The active participation of critics from the North makes a lot of sense, considering their significant
resources and capacity.87 Nevertheless, the collaboration between these players in the North and developing
countries in the South has clearly shown that the developments in the international intellectual property
arena have now gone beyond negotiations among nation states. Such developments also highlight the
growing opportunity for the South to collaborate with the North—through academics, mass media or
nongovernmental organisations.88
Indeed, nongovernmental organisations have been increasingly successful in pushing for a greater
recognition of the changing nature of global governance models. The World Summit on the Information
Society and later the Internet Governance Forum provide good examples of how these models have shifted.
So do the ongoing discourse on access to medicines and the emerging debate on access to knowledge.89
While non-state actors still have a long road to travel before they can become highly influential in the
international intellectual property debate, there is no denying that the governance model has slowly evolved
to cover these new and increasingly powerful actors.
In sum, ACTA offers not only insights into the development of club standards and the emerging
non-multilateral era but also an important case study on the various layers of politics behind the development
of the international intellectual property regime. While the agreement is both disappointing and disturbing,
it does inspire us to think more deeply about the role politics can play in the future development of this
regime.

Conclusion
Only a few years ago, commentators were widely criticising WIPO for its lack of legitimacy. As Christopher
May noted shortly after the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda, “[a]t the centre of [this]
Agenda is a critique of the WIPO that suggests it represents a narrowly focused set of political economic
interests that seek to expand the realm of commodified knowledge and information for their own commercial
advantage”.90 Likewise, Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield observed:
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“There are perceptions that the Bureau is acting not as the servant of the whole international community
but as an institution with its own agenda. That agenda seems more closely attuned to the interests
and demands of some Member States than to others, and more to pro-strong intellectual property
protection interest groups and practitioner associations, which are ostensibly observers but sometimes
behave and are treated like Member States, than to the interest of developing countries.”91
In the midst of the ACTA negotiations, however, commentators have begun calling on the ACTA
negotiations to be moved back to WIPO. As the Wellington Declaration, which was drafted by the
participants of the PublicACTA Conference in New Zealand, proclaims:
“We note that the World Intellectual Property Organisation has public, inclusive and transparent
processes for negotiating multilateral agreements on (and a committee dedicated to the enforcement
of) copyright, trademark and patent rights, and thus we affirm that WIPO is a preferable forum for
the negotiation of substantive provisions affecting these matters.”
For those of us who have paid close attention to the establishment of the WIPO Development Agenda,
it was indeed astonishing to see this quick change of public perception of WIPO—from an organisation
widely criticised for being heavily captured by developed countries and their industries to a totally different
one that is noted for having “public, inclusive and transparent processes”. Such a swift about-turn is indeed
indicative of the highly dynamic nature of international intellectual property developments. It also
underscores our need for greater appreciation of the complex political dynamics behind such developments.
Although intellectual property is a largely legal construct,92 it is not just about law and economics. It is
also about politics. As Sebastian Haunss and Ken Shandlen write in the introduction to their timely
collection of essays on the politics of intellectual property:
“[M]ost studies [of intellectual property policy-making] focus on national and international IP laws.
But while laws are solidified results of social struggles and political conflicts, understanding the law
itself tells us little about the social processes that lay behind laws and even less about the social
dynamics that will eventually challenge and often change them. Laws establish opportunities for
action, and strictly legal perspectives in most cases say little about different actors’ motivations and
capacities to exploit these opportunities and how the motivations and capacities change over time.
It is time, therefore, to reorient analysis of the politics of IP to the processes by which conflicts over
the ownership, use, and control of information are manifest and resolved in regional, national and
sub-national settings.”93
While the political aspects of intellectual property have been largely understudied, the academic landscape
has been slowly changing. As more scholars become interested in the subject, we will have a deeper and
fuller understanding of the international intellectual property regime. We will also be in a better position
to anticipate potential struggles and conflicts while designing appropriate reforms to resolve them. By
bringing together leading scholars studying the politics of intellectual property and players at the frontline
of international intellectual property policymaking, it is my hope that this special issue will help generate
more attention in this under-explored area.
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